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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID B. SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010949-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for communications fraud, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for communications 
fraud?1 
Standard of Review. This Court "view[s] the evidence and all inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 
18, 10 P.3d 346. It will not reverse that verdict unless "the evidence 'is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
1
 Defendant does not challenge his conviction for securities fraud. See Aplt. Brf. 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted."1 Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 
(Utah 1993)). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1801 (1990) 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
* * * 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000; 
* * * 
(6) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. Means of communication include, but are not 
limited to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, 
computer, and spoken and written communication. 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count of securities fraud, or 
in the alternative, communications fraud; one count of communications fraud; one count of 
theft; and two counts of money laundering. R. 22-24. Following a preliminary hearing, 
defendant was bound over for trial on securities fraud and communications fraud only. R. 
2 
81-82; see also R. 278: 691-92. The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the 
bindover order and this Court denied defendant's petition for an interlocutory appeal. R. 83-
117, 139, 169-72, 176.2 
Following a three-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged. R. 729-35; 787, 
930-32. Before sentencing, defendant filed a pro se Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial. R. 832-40. Without addressing the 
motion, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of not more than ten 
years for securities fraud and one-to-fifteen years for communications fraud. R. 883-85, 
895-96. The sentences were suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation 
for 36 months. R. 896-97. Defendant timely appealed his conviction for communications 
fraud. R. 888-89. The trial court thereafter denied defendant's Motion for a Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial. R. 939-40. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
An Investment Opportunity 
On October 13,1994, Marc Sorenson visited his friend Lance Hatch at Hatch's home 
in St. George. R. 930: 95-96, 117-20. During the visit, Hatch told Sorenson about an 
investment opportunity that he said was being run by defendant. R. 930: 95, 130. Hatch 
explained that the investments received would be used to create a $500,000 bank account 
2
 At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution relied in part on a transcript of 
defendant's interview with Nevada authorities. See R. 57: 208-09. Defendant moved to 
quash the bindover order after discovering that the first page of the transcript incorrectly 
attributed to defendant offhand remarks made by a Nevada assistant attorney general that 
were in the nature of a confession by defendant. See R. 83-117, 139. 
3 
that was needed to permit the legal transfer of a large quantity of money from a foreign 
country into the United States. R. 930:121,130-31. He explained that there would be a "big 
commission" for those who set up the account and expressed his belief that "there was a 
great deal of money to be made" by those who invested. R. 930: 117-18, 121, 130. Hatch 
told Sorenson that he had spoke with defendant about the investment, but that he could not 
personally sell the investment because he did not have a license as a financial advisor. R. 
930: 117,120,130. He also indicated that he would invest in the scheme himself, if only he 
had the money to do so. R. 930: 119. 
After Hatch told Sorenson how impressed he was with the opportunity, Sorenson 
expressed an interest in the investment and asked to find out more about it. R. 930: 95-96, 
117-18. Because Hatch had learned about the investment from Lee Walker—an attorney-
friend of his in Las Vegas who had done business with defendant—he telephoned Walker to 
discuss defendant's character and expertise. R. 930:97,122-23,130,139. In that telephone 
conversation, Walker assured Sorenson that defendant was able to perform on the investment 
and he otherwise vouched for defendant's integrity. See R. 930: 97, 122-23, 142. 
Sorenson 9s Telephone Conversation with Defendant 
After the two spoke with Walker, Hatch telephoned defendant, who explained the 
investment opportunity in greater detail to Sorenson. R. 930: 96-97,122,125,139-40,143. 
In that call, defendant confirmed that he was running the investment. See R. 930: 97-98. 
Defendant represented to Sorenson that a foreigner named Walid Summa was attempting to 
transfer one billion dollars into the United States. R. 930: 98,131-32. He explained that in 
4 
order to do so legally, an independent bank account of $500,000 needed to be set up in the 
United States. R. 930: 98-99. Defendant told Sorenson that an account had been set up in 
the name of the investment brokerage house of Bear Stearns, and that once the $500,000 was 
raised, the one billion dollars could be transferred to the United States through that account. 
R. 930: 99. He explained that those who set up the bank account would receive a large 
commission on the one billion dollars. R. 930: 99-100, 150. He said that if Sorenson 
invested, he would "make a profit of 275 percent on the money invested within a period of 
approximately two and-a-half months." R. 930: 99-100. 
Defendant did not advise Sorenson to further investigate Walid Summa, nor did he 
advise him to employ a brokerage firm to give him advice regarding the proposed 
investment. R. 930: 132-34. Instead, defendant told Sorenson that he had done many such 
investments in the past and that this investment "was the closest thing to a sure thing that you 
could ever get." R. 930: 101,170, 178. 
The Investment Contract 
Two days later, Sorenson agreed to invest $100,000 and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding that directed that the $100,000 investment funds be transferred to the Bear 
Steams account and to defendant's account. R. 930: 102,105-09,147-48; see also R. 932: 
932: 337. Two days after that, on October 17, 1994, Sorenson signed a second, modified 
Memorandum of Understanding, specifically directing that $50,000 be sent to the Bear 
5 
Stearns account and $50,000 be sent to defendant's account. R. 930: 109.3 Sorenson did not 
give defendant permission to use the money for personal items, but understood, based on his 
conversation with defendant, that all $100,000 would be invested. R. 930: 102-03. 
Unbeknownst to Sorenson, the Memorandum bore several hallmarks of a fraudulent 
transaction. For example, it referred to Prime Bank Instruments, which have never been 
found to be legitimate transactions. R. 931: 217, 219.4 It referred to a World Prime Bank, 
which does not exist. R. 931: 217. It referred to "banking days," which has no legitimate 
meaning in the investment context. R. 931: 217-18. It referred to rules and regulations of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, which does not issue rules or regulations. R. 931: 
219. And finally, it promised an unrealistic rate of return. R. 931: 218. 
At Hatch's suggestion, Sorenson directed that the money be sent through a trust 
account controlled by Walker in Nevada with instructions that it be distributed according to 
the investment contract. R. 930:102,126,165,167. Hatch reasoned that the money should 
be sent through Walker's trust account to make sure that it did not go directly to defendant 
and because he wanted to hold Walker's "feet to the fire" as the person who told Hatch about 
3
 Anthony Taggert, director of the Utah Division of Securities, testified that the 
transaction culminating in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding fit the 
definition of an investment contract, and as such, was subject to the securities disclosure 
laws. R. 931:244-51. Based on Taggert's testimony, the jury learned that defendant failed 
to disclose a number of facts that the average investor would find important in making an 
investment decision. R. 931: 248-51. Based in part on these omissions, the jury found 
defendant guilty of securities fraud. See R. 787. 
4
 Based on his investigation of some 1,000 such transactions dating back to 1993, 
Herbert A. Biern, a senior official with the Federal Reserve Board, provided expert 
testimony on the fraudulent nature of "prime bank instruments." See R. 931: 208-20. 
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the investment. R. 930: 167. On October 18, 1994, a day after he signed the second 
Memorandum, Sorenson transferred $100,000 to Walker's account. R. 930: 161. On that 
same day, $50,000 was transferred from Walker's trust account to the Bear Stearns account 
and $50,000 was transferred from Walker's account to defendant in Florida. R. 930: 162. 
Defendant's Personal Use of Investment Funds 
The wire transfer increased defendant's account balance from zero to $50,000. R. 
930:162. Defendant did not use the funds for investment purposes as represented. Within a 
day of receiving the funds, defendant wrote a check from the account for nearly $35,000 for 
the purchase of a new Jeep. R. 930: 163; R. 931: 293-94. Within a week, the remaining 
balance was also used for personal expenses, including a $2,000 check payable to cash, a 
$6,500 house payment, and a $2,000 tuition payment. R. 930: 159, 163-64. Nothing was 
drawn from the account that would qualify as an investment expense. R. 930: 164-65. 
Defendant's Assurances that Sorenson Would Receive His Money 
When Sorenson did not receive his money as represented, he repeatedly telephoned 
defendant to find out when he would receive it. See R. 930: 103, 173-74. Each time, 
defendant assured him that he would get his money. R. 930:104,174. He claimed that uthe 
money was imminent, that it was going to be back," and that he was working on a deal to get 
the money back. R. 930: 104,174. Not once, however, did defendant divulge to Sorenson 
that he had spent the funds on personal expenses. R. 930: 104-05. Sorenson never received 
any money. R. 930: 95. 
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In April 1995, Sorenson filed a complaint with Nevada authorities against Walker, 
through whom the money was transferred. R. 930: 104, 135-36. Thereafter, defendant 
telephoned Sorenson, blaming Sorenson for the failure and threatening to sue Sorenson. R. 
930: 104. Later, at defendant's preliminary hearing, defendant walked up to Sorenson and 
told him that he realized he needed to get Sorenson's money back to him. R. 930: 105. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he devised the 
fraudulent investment scheme. This claim lacks merit. Sorenson testified that based on a 
telephone conversation with defendant and Hatch, he understood that defendant was running 
the scheme. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant told him that he was running the 
scheme. On the other hand, if Hatch made the statement during the call, the jury could infer 
that defendant ratified that statement because nothing suggests that he disputed its veracity. 
Other evidence also supports the finding. By defendant's own admission, Walker sought 
direction from him as to where the funds should be distributed. In addition, the investment 
contract provided defendant's bank coordinates and directed that half of the investment 
money be sent to defendant. And finally, defendant received and spent the money. 
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
communicated with Sorenson for the purpose of concealing the scheme. Defendant does not 
challenge the evidence per se, but claims that based on his own testimony, the evidence 
establishes only a moral obligation for him to repay the money. Defendant's claim fails 
because the jury is not required to accept defendant's version of the facts. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Under Utah law, a person is guilty of communications fraud if he or she udevise[s] 
any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and [ ] communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1) (1990). Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
two elements of the crime: (1) that he devised the fraudulent scheme or artifice, and (2) that 
he communicated with the victim for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme. 
Aplt. Brf. at 22-27. Defendant's contention lacks merit. 
A. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT DEVISED THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME 
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence established the existence of a fraudulent 
scheme or artifice. Rather, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that it was 
he who devised that scheme. Defendant acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that defendant 
explained the investment scheme to him, but argues that mere knowledge of the scheme is 
insufficient to establish that he devised the scheme. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23, 25. He also 
acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that he understood defendant to be the person running 
the investment scheme, but argues that it is insufficient because it is based on the hearsay 
statements of Hatch. Aplt. Brf. at 25. Defendant's argument ignores the evidence. 
9 
Defendant's knowledge of the investment scheme, standing alone, would be 
insufficient to establish that he devised the scheme. And standing alone, Hatch's hearsay 
statement regarding defendant's role in the scheme, not objected to at trial, would be 
insufficient. See State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Utah 1989) (holding that "a single 
uncorroborated hearsay statement is not substantial evidence and not sufficient to support a 
verdict"). However, the State's evidence that defendant devised the scheme was not limited 
to the foregoing testimony. 
Sorenson also testified that Walker told him defendant had "orchestrated" the 
investment scheme. R. 930: 142. And more importantly, defendant's role as the author of 
the scheme was confirmed in Sorenson's telephone conversation with defendant himself. 
During the prosecutor's direct examination of Sorenson, the following exchange took place: 
Prosecutor: Based on the two phone calls that you have previously 
described—narrow it down—based on your phone call to 
Mr. Smith, did you come to an understanding of who was 
running the investment? 
Sorenson: Yes, I did. 
Prosecutor: Who was that? 
Sorenson: Mr. Smith. 
R. 930: 97-98. Although Sorenson did not expressly testify that defendant told him he was 
running the investment scheme, the jury could reasonably infer that Sorenson came to 
understand that defendant was running the investment scheme because defendant told him so 
during the telephone conversation. 
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Because Hatch also participated in the call, it is possible that he, rather than 
defendant, informed Sorenson during the call that defendant was running the investment 
scheme. Even so, defendant obviously did not deny he was running the investment scheme 
because Sorenson finished the call with that understanding intact. Defendant's silence would 
therefore imply a tacit acceptance or ratification of any statement made by Hatch to that 
effect. Cf. Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah 1998) (holding that a principal's 
"silence with full knowledge of the facts may manifest affirmance and thus operate as a 
ratification"). 
In later direct examination, the following testimony was also elicited: 
Prosecutor: Did you and Mr. Smith have any discussion one way or 
another about the risk of loss in this investment? 
Sorenson: Yes, we did. 
Prosecutor: And, basically, what did Mr. Smith tell you? 
Sorenson: Paraphrasing, he said it was the closest thing to a sure thing 
that you could ever get. 
* * * 
Prosecutor: Did Mr. Smith tell you anything about his experience in 
doing these types of investments? 
Sorenson: He said that he had done many of them in the past. 
R. 930: 101. This testimony brings into context the conversation between Sorenson and 
defendant. Defendant specifically discussed his past experiences of "doing" or running such 
investments and the jury could reasonably infer that he represented to Sorenson that the 
investment he was "doing" now "was the closest thing to a sure thing that you could ever 
get." R. 101. 
11 
That defendant devised the investment scheme was also established by defendant's 
own testimony and the circumstantial evidence surrounding the investment. Defendant 
himself acknowledged that within a few days after he spoke with Sorenson, Walker called 
him wanting to know where the $100,000 should be transferred. R. 931: 288. The 
Memorandum of Understanding provided defendant's bank coordinates and directed that half 
of the investment go to that account. R. 930: 109. And finally, $50,000 was in fact 
transferred to defendant's bank account, which he immediately spent. R. 930:162-65. This 
evidence strongly buttresses Sorenson's testimony that defendant orchestrated the scheme. 
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant had in fact devised the 
scheme and realized the fruits of that scheme when he receive the $50,000 wire transfer. 
In addition, the jury was free to consider defendant's statement to Sorenson at the 
preliminary hearing that he realized he needed to get Sorenson's money back to him. R. 930: 
105. Although the statement might simply imply a moral obligation to return the money, the 
jury was also free to infer that it manifested a consciousness of guilt, and therefore, guilt 
itself. Cf. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, t 23 n.6, 10 P.3d 346 (referring to evidence of 
flight). 
Defendant claims, however, that the evidence was insufficient because Sorenson's 
friend Hatch, not defendant, told him about the investment, provided him with the 
investment contract, and suggested that the money go through Lee Walker's trust account. 
Aplt. Brf. at 23-24. The State, however, was not required to prove that every aspect of the 
offer and sell of the security originated from defendant. The State was only required to 
12 
prove that defendant "devised" the fraudulent scheme. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1). Thus, it is of no moment that Hatch was the person who first approached Sorenson 
about the investment. Nor is it of any import that Hatch, rather than defendant, provided 
Sorenson with the Memorandum of Understanding, informed Sorenson that there were other 
investors, or suggested that the investment funds go through Walker's trust account. None of 
these facts undermine the State's evidence that defendant "devised" the fraudulent scheme. 
One cannot shield himself from criminal liability simply by perpetrating the fraud through 
others. 
Defendant also criticizes the evidence because Sorenson did not know how Hatch 
obtained the Memorandum of Understanding, did not have a specific recollection of signing 
a second memorandum, and did not recall the reasons for modifying the original 
memorandum. Aplt. Brf. at 23-24. These gaps in the evidence, however, do not in any way 
undermine the evidence introduced at trial establishing that defendant devised the investment 
scheme. As held by the Supreme Court in State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,544 (Utah 1994), 
a defendant "is not entitled to reversal of [his] conviction... simply because there are some 
gaps in the State's evidence." 
Finally, defendant points to his own testimony denying that he had anything to do 
with the investment scheme and claiming that he believed the $50,000 wire transfer was a 
payment from Summa on an outstanding debt. Aplt. Brf. at 24-25. These disclaimers do not 
undermine the sufficiency of the evidence. "The jury need not accept defendant's version of 
the facts but may disregard it in whole or in part." Goddard, 871 P.2d at 544. Defendant "is 
13 
not entitled to reversal of [his] conviction simply because [his] version of the facts is 
different from the State's." Id. 
B. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT COMMUNICATED WITH THE VICTIM FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
CONCEALING THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME 
Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
"'communicate[d] directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of 
either 'executing the scheme or artifice' or 'concealing the scheme or artifice.1" Aplt. Brf at 
25-26 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)). This claim also lacks merit. 
Defendant acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that he spoke with defendant on the 
telephone six times concerning payment on his investment. Aplt. Brf. at 26 (citing R. 930: 
103-04,174). He also acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that defendant represented that 
the money was "imminent" and would be paid. Aplt. Brf. at 26 (citing R. 930: 104, 174). 
He does not, however, explain why that testimony is insufficient to establish that he 
communicated with Sorenson for the purpose of concealing the scheme. Therefore, his 
claim must fail. See West Valley City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, f 13, 51 P.3d 52 
(holding that appellant must marshal the evidence supporting the finding and then "must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in th[at] evidence").5 
Where the evidence established that defendant devised the scheme, see supra, at 9-
14, and that he had already spent the $50,000 transferred to his account, R. 930: 163-65, the 
evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant omitted the material fact that 
he had spent the money, and misrepresented that the money was "imminent," for the purpose 
of concealing the fraudulent scheme. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). 
14 
Defendant's only challenge to the evidence rests on his own testimony that he did not 
know the money came from Sorenson until after he had spent it. Aplt. Brf. at 26 (citing R. 
931: 300). Relying on that testimony, defendant argues that "the evidence only demonstrates 
the moral obligation to return Sorenson's money which [defendant] felt when he learned 
where the deposit actually originated." Aplt. Brf. at 26. As noted above, however, "[t]he 
jury need not accept defendant's version of the facts but may disregard it in whole or in 
part." Goddard, 871 P.2d at 544. Defendant's claim on this point thus also fails. 
* * * 
In summary, defendant's conviction for communications fraud is supported by 
Sorenson's testimony, defendant's testimony, the terms of the investment contract, and the 
evidence establishing that defendant received and spent $50,000 of Sorenson's investment. 
It cannot be said that "the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he [ ] was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 18 
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
15 
Respectfully submitted July 2, 2003. 
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